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Footnotes
1. State Cases: Luciano v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. 1 CA-CV 08-
0566, 2010 WL 1491952, at *7-8 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2010)
(referring to motion as both a “counter motion” and a “cross
motion”); accord, Brumgard v. Rios, No. 2 CA-CV 2010-0007, 2010
WL 3489159, at *1 & n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2010); Leatherby
Ins. Co. v. City of Tustin, 143 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156 (Cal. App. 1977);
Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 219 P.3d 440, 443
(Idaho 2009); Robinson v. Builders Supply & Lumber Co., 586
N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Lemen v. 21st Century Nat’l
Ins. Co., 286 P.3d 240, at *8 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012); Univ. of Cum-
berlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Ky. 2010); Sci.
Drilling Intern., Inc. v. Meche, 29 So.3d 1283, 1284-85 (La. Ct.
App. 2010); Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 841 A.2d 858,
861 (Md. 2004); Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Leukuma, No. 287802,
2009 WL 5194517, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009); Carlton
v. Walters, 294 S.W.3d 513, 515-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Harris v.
Vasquez, 288 P.3d 924, 925 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012); Lawrence Twp.,
Stark Cnty., Ohio, Bd. of Twp. Tr. v. Canal Fulton, No. 2007 CA
00010, 2007 WL 3408448, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2007);
Am. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 844 A.2d 117, 125-26 (R.I.
2004); Robertson v. George, No. M2000-02661-COA-R3-CV, 2001
WL 1173270, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2001); Salt Lake Cnty.
Comm’n v. Salt Lake Co. Atty., 985 P.2d 899, 901 & n.1 (Utah
1999).
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.
of the State of Nev., Rule 2.20(f) (“An opposition to a motion
which contains a motion related to the same subject matter will be
considered as a counter-motion.”); cf. Utah Rules of Civ. Proc.,
Family Law Rule 101(g) (“Opposing a motion is not sufficient to
grant relief to the responding party. An application for an order
may be raised by counter motion.”); Local Rules of the Super. Ct.
for Pierce Cnty., Wash., Rule 7(b)(1)(D)(ii) (“In the event there is
an existing motion and the responding party wishes to file a
counter motion to be heard the same date they may do so without
leave of the court by electronically filing and scheduling in accor-
dance with PCLR 7(b)(1)(D) a Note for Commissioner’s Calendar,
as long as the counter motion and all supporting pleadings are filed
and served at least fourteen (14) calendar days before the hear-
ing.”).
Federal Cases: Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376, 1382 (7th
Cir. 1983) (referring to motion both as a “counter motion” and a
“cross motion”); accord, White v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 04-CV-
0397, 2005 WL 1865495, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2005); Parra v.
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 & n.3 (N.D.
Cal. 2003); Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc. v.
Applied Materials, Inc., 93-CV-20853, 1994 WL 715634, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1994); Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430, 433
(N.D. Cal. 1990); George v. United States, 94-CV-2769, 1996 WL
437532, at *1 (D. Colo. June 14, 1996); United States v. Char-
boneau, 04-CV-0442, 2005 WL 2346947, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26,
2005); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Metro Mark Prods., Ltd., 43 F. Supp.
2d 951, 953 & n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Maneikis v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of
Ill., 79-CV-3731, 1980 WL 343874, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1980);
AAR, Inc. v. Century Inv. Group, LLC, 08-CV-0007, 2010 WL
497747, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2010); Wells v. Home Depot USA,
Inc., 11-CV-12884, 2012 WL 995206, at *1 & n.1 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
13, 2012); Barrett v. Detroit Heading, LLC, 05-CV-72341, 2006 WL
1662553, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 8, 2006); St. Louis Trimming, Inc.
v. Am. Credit Indem. Co., 924 F. Supp. 99, 100 (E.D. Mo. 1996);
Interface Group–Nev., Inc. v. Men’s Apparel Guild in Cal. Inc., 04-
CV-0351, 2007 WL 923952, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2007); Dehne
v. Avanino, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (D. Nev. 2001); Moultrie v.
Misunderstandings regarding the definition of a cross-motion often lead to problems during the filing andbriefing of cross-motions in state and federal courts.
This article focuses on defining and illustrating the elements of
a proper cross-motion, identifying and illustrating common
problems caused by the filing and briefing of improper cross-
motions, and offering solutions to those problems.
As most commonly understood by judges and practitioners,
a cross-motion in state or federal court possesses three elements:
(1) it is filed against the originally moving party; (2) it is filed by
a party against whom the original motion was filed; and (3) it
requests an order similar to that requested by the originally mov-
ing party against the cross-moving party. Common problems
posed by the filing and briefing of improper cross-motions in
state and federal court include (1) a violation of the action’s
motion-filing deadline, (2) a violation of the court’s proscription
against the filing of replies on cross-motions, (3) a violation of
the court’s proscription against the filing of sur-replies on dis-
positive motions, and (4) a violation of the court’s page limita-
tion on memoranda of law. Possible solutions to those common
problems include (1) filing a motion before the opposing party
files its motion, (2) requesting leave to depart from the action’s
scheduling order or the court’s local rules, (3) moving to strike
the improper cross-motion, and (4) in the context of pleading
amendments, filing a timely amended complaint rather than a
cross-motion for leave to file an amended complaint in response
to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.                        
I. DEFINITION OF A CROSS-MOTION
A. TERM AS COMPARED TO “COUNTER-MOTION”
Sometimes, a motion is referred to as both a “cross-motion”
and a “counter-motion.”1 In such cases, either the terms are
used interchangeably or the term “counter-motion” refers to a
particular type of “cross-motion”: specifically, that type of
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S. Carolina Election Com’n, 06-CV-3073, 2007 WL 445383, at *1
(D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2007); United States v. Hill, 533 F. Supp. 810, 813
(D. Tenn. 1982).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: E.D. Cal. Civ. L.R.
230(e) (“Any counter-motion or other motion that a party may
desire to make that is related to the general subject matter of the
original motion shall be served and filed in the manner and on the
date prescribed for the filing of opposition.”); N.D. Cal. Civil L.R.
16-5 (“Defendant must serve and file any opposition or counter-
motion within 28 days of service of plaintiff’s motion.”); U.S.
Bankr. Ct. Rules N.D.Cal., B.L.R. 7007-1(d) (“Together with an
opposition, a party responding to a motion may file a counter-
motion related to the subject matter of the original motion.”); E.D.
Mich. L.R. Appendix ECF, R5(e) (“[A] response or reply to a
motion must not be combined with a counter-motion. Papers filed
in violation of this rule will be stricken.”); N.D. Miss. L.R.
7(b)(3)(C) (“A response to a motion may not include a counter-
motion in the same document. Any motion must be an item dock-
eted separately from a response.”).
2. State Cases: Leatherby Ins. Co. v. City of Tustin, 143 Cal. Rptr.
153, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar
Corp., 219 P.3d 440, 443 (Idaho 2009); Robinson v. Builders Sup-
ply & Lumber Co., 586 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
Lemen v. 21st Century Nat’l Ins. Co., 286 P.3d 240, at *8 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2012); Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 841 A.2d 858,
861 (Md. 2004); Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Leukuma, No. 287802,
2009 WL 5194517, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009); Carlton
v. Walters, 294 S.W.3d 513, 515-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Harris v.
Vasquez, 288 P.3d 924, 925 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012); Am. Condo.
Ass’n, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 844 A.2d 117, 125-26 (R.I. 2004); Robert-
son v. George, No. M2000-02661-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1173270,
at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2001); Salt Lake County Com’n v. Salt
Lake Co. Atty., 985 P.2d 899, 901 & n.1 (Utah 1999).
Federal Cases: Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376, 1382 (7th
Cir. 1983); White v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 04-CV-0397, 2005 WL
1865495, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2005); Roberts v. Heim, 130
F.R.D. 430, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1990); George v. United States, 94-CV-
2769, 1996 WL 437532, at *1 (D. Colo. June 14, 1996); Maneikis
v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill., 79-CV-3731, 1980 WL 343874, at *1
(N.D. Ill. May 23, 1980); AAR, Inc. v. Century Inv. Group, LLC,
08-CV-0007, 2010 WL 497747, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2010); Wells
v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 11-CV-12884, 2012 WL 995206, at *1 &
n.1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2012); St. Louis Trimming, Inc. v. Am.
Credit Indem. Co., 924 F. Supp. 99, 100 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Moultrie
v. S. Carolina Election Com’n, 06-CV-3073, 2007 WL 445383, at
*1 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2007); United States v. Hill, 533 F. Supp. 810,
813 (D. Tenn. 1982).
3. State Cases: Bohac v. Akbani, 29 S.W.3d 407, 414, n.6 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (“The parties refer to Father’s [motion] as a ‘cross-
motion’ to modify, although it should be denominated a ‘counter-
motion’ to modify.”); Vives v. Verzino, 213 P.3d 823, 825 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2009) (“The parties refer to Respondents’ counter-motion for
summary judgment as a cross-motion, a fact this Court does not
change for consistency.”); Tex. v. Rhodes, No. 04-96-00040-CV,
1997 WL 81257, at *1, n.7 (Tex. App. Feb. 26, 1997) (“Appellant
has denominated its motion a cross-motion rather than a counter
motion. We will do the same.”). 
Federal Cases: Copas v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 61 F. Supp. 2d
1017, 1041, n.9 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“The court does not consider a
‘counter-motion’ filed two weeks after the dispositive motions fil-
ing deadline to be a cross-motion.”); Tyler v. Butler, 06-CV-0861,
2009 WL 2447918, at *6, n.10 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2009) (“Buried
within this exhibit is a putative cross-motion for summary judg-
ment, which plaintiff calls a ‘counter-motion’ . . . .”); Stringham v.
Lee, 04-CV-1530 2008 WL 2880406, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 22,
2008) (“Pending before the court are . . . plaintiff’s cross-motion
for summary judgment (denominated by plaintiff a ‘counter
motion’) . . . .”); Cook v. Cashler, 11-CV-0637, 2013 WL
1213678, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2013) (“Plaintiff refers to his
cross-motions for summary judgment as ‘counter motions’ for
summary judgment.”); Cannon v. City of Phila., 86 F. Supp. 2d
460, 462, n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“Plaintiff refers to her motion as a
countermotion. I will interpret plaintiff’s motion as a cross-motion
for summary judgment.”); cf. PAETEC Commc’ns, Inc. v. Comm-
Partners, LLC, 08-CV-0397, 2010 WL 1767193, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb.
18, 2010) (calling defendant’s motion a “cross motion” even
though defendant labeled it a “counter-motion,” which term the
court placed in quotation marks).
4. State Case: Zaloudek Grain Co. v. CompSource Okla., No.
110,662, 2012 WL 4077382, at *1 (Okla. Sept. 18, 2012) (describ-
ing how plaintiff filed a “motion” for summary judgment on a cer-
tain ground, then defendant filed a “cross motion” for summary
judgment with regard to the same ground, and then plaintiff filed
a “counter motion” for summary judgment on a different ground).
Federal Case: Forkwar v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 487 F.
App’x 775, 777 (4th Cir. June 27, 2012) (“The district court denied
Forkwar’s motion for summary judgment, granted Empire’s cross-
motion for summary judgment, and denied Forkwar’s counter
motion for summary judgment.”).
5. Federal Case: Kowalski v. Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, 05-CV-
00679, 2008 WL 4216267, at *1 (D. Haw. Sept. 15, 2008) (draw-
ing distinction between a counter-motion and a cross-motion, not-
ing that the former refers to a motion raising the same subject mat-
ter as an original motion, and the latter refers to an “independent”
motion unrelated to the subject matter of the original motion).
Federal Rule: D. Haw. L.R. 7.9 (“Counter Motions. . . . Any motion
raising the same subject matter as an original motion may be filed
by the responding party together with the party’s opposition . . . .”).   
6. State Cases: Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 135 (Del. 2009)
(describing how defendants filed a “motion to dismiss,” plaintiff
filed a “counter-motion for summary judgment,” and defendants
filed a “cross-motion for summary judgment”); Dillon v. Typaldos,
cross-motion filed responsively as opposed to originally. For
example, when a party files a motion and another party files a
“counter-motion,” some courts treat that counter-motion as
rendering the original motion and counter-motion together as
“cross-motions.”2
Other times, however, a nominal distinction is recognized
between a “cross-motion” and a “counter-motion.”3 Still other
times, a material distinction is recognized between the two
terms. For example, sometimes a “counter-motion” refers to a
motion filed subsequent, and in opposition, to an initial
motion but based on different grounds as those of the initial
motion.4 Other times, a “counter-motion” refers to a motion
related to the subject matter of the original motion, while a
“cross-motion” refers to an independent motion unrelated to
the subject matter of the original motion.5 Yet other times, a
“counter-motion” refers to a motion filed against a moving
party seeking relief dissimilar to that sought in the original
motion (as opposed to a “cross-motion,” which refers to a
motion filed against a moving party seeking relief that is simi-
lar to that sought in the original motion).6
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2006 WL 1381625, at *1, 6, 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., May 19,
2006) (describing how plaintiff filed a “motion” to reinstate the
complaint, defendants filed a “cross-motion to dismiss” the com-
plaint, and plaintiff filed a “counter motion” to add defendants). 
Federal Cases: Wang Labs., Inc. v. Ma Labs., Inc., 95-CV-2274,
1995 WL 729298, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1995) (“Ma . . . and
Wang . . . bring cross motions for summary judgment based on the
provisions of a license agreement executed between the parties. Ma
also brings a counter motion for summary judgment arguing that
certain accused devices fall outside of the licensing agreement.”);
Kingdom 5-KR-41, Ltd. v. Star Cruises PLC, 01-CV-2946, 2005 WL
110434, at *1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2005) (referring to NCL’s
motion to revive a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60[b], filed in
response to motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59 [e] or 60, as a “countermotion,” and referring to NCL’s motion
for summary judgment on that claim, filed in response to motion
for summary judgment on that claim, as a “cross-motion”); Health-
point, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 817, 826 (W.D. Tex.
2001) (“Beginning March 22, 2001 . . . , the Court held a consoli-
dated evidentiary hearing on Ethex’s motion for preliminary
injunction and Healthpoint’s cross motion for preliminary injunc-
tion. . . . In addition, this report also addresses Ethex’s related
motion to dismiss or to stay and Healthpoint’s counter-motion to
partially dismiss . . . .”); cf. Hawkins v. Sup. Ct. of NJ, 04-CV-1317,
2005 WL 2133588, at *10, n.11 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2005) (noting
that “Plaintiff’s brief filed in response to the motion to dismiss is
entitled a ‘Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint and in Support of Plaintiff’s Countermotion to Disqual-
ify the Attorney General’s Office From Representing Itself and
Codefendants Herein and In Support of Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment’”).
7. Law Dictionaries and Encyclopedias: BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1106 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a competing
request for relief or order similar to that requested by another party
against the cross-moving party . . . . ”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DIC-
TIONARY OF LAW 116 (1996) (defining a “cross-motion” as “[a]
motion that attempts to counter a similar motion filed by an
opposing party . . . .”); MELLINKOFF’S DICTIONARY OF AM. LEGAL
USAGE 143 (1992) (defining a “cross-motion” as an “opposing
motion, usually requesting a result opposite to original motion”);
THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 714 (2011) (defin-
ing “cross-motion” as “[a] motion similar to a motion filed earlier
by another party. A cross motion is a motion for some ruling or
order filed by a party to an action that is similar in its request to
another motion already pending. . . . Note: a cross-motion must
seek the same order or similar relief or ruling as a prior motion,
with the cross-motion seeking an order or rule to the benefit of the
cross-movant, while the original movant sought the original order
for its own benefit.”); Lawyers.com Legal Dictionary,
http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/cross-motion.html (defining
a “cross-motion” as “a motion that attempts to counter a similar
motion filed by an opposing party . . . . ”); cf. 56 AM. JUR. 2D
Motions, Rules, and Orders § 29 (2011) (“A cross-motion generally
is an improper vehicle for seeking affirmative relief from a non-
moving party.”), accord, 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 33 (2012);
7A FED. PROC. LAWYERS ED. § 19:146 (2011) (“A cross-motion
must be contained in the same document as the response to the
original motion, and a response to the cross-motion must be con-
tained in the same document as the reply . . . . ”). 
State Cases: Barrett v. Watkins, 860 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) (“A cross motion is an improper vehicle for seeking
affirmative relief from a nonmoving party.”); accord, Terio v.
Spodek, 809 N.Y.S.2d 145, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Mango v.
Long Is. Jewish–Hillside Med. Ctr., 507 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986); Barber v. Cornell Univ. Co-op., 37 Misc.3d 1217,
2012 WL 5392228, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 2012); Sandler v.
Sophie D. Ltd., 936 N.Y.S.2d 61, 2011 WL 3558224, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 11, 2011); Cardona-Torres v. City of N.Y., 2011 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 6557, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011) (“A cross-
motion is merely a motion by any party against the party who
made the original motion, made returnable at the same time as the
original motion.”); accord, Hisen v. 754 Fifth Ave. Assoc., L.P., 886
N.Y.S.2d 67, 2009 WL 1098985, at *6, n.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009);
XO Communs., LLC v. Level 3 Communs., Inc., 948 A.2d 1111,
1117 (Del. Ch. 2007) (calling motion filed against moving party a
“cross-motion”); accord, Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 94
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); Nelson v. Planet Ins. Co., 111 Nev.
1373, 1376 (Nev. 1995). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Eighth Judicial Dist. of
Nev. Civ. Rule 2.20(f) (“An opposition to a motion which contains
a motion related to the same subject matter will be considered as
a counter-motion.”); N.J. Rules of Court § 1:6-3(b) (“A cross-
motion may be filed and served by the responding party together
with that party’s opposition to the motion . . . .”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
2215(b) (“[A] party may serve upon the moving party a notice of
cross-motion demanding relief, with or without supporting papers
. . . .”); Mass. Super. Ct. Rule 9A(b)(3) (“A cross-motion, accom-
panied by the other documents specified in Paragraph (a)(1) of
this rule, shall be served on the moving party with the opposition
to the original motion. A party opposing a cross-motion may serve
a memorandum in opposition within (A) 10 days after service of
a cross-motion other than a cross-motion for summary judgment,
(B) 21 days after service of a cross-motion for summary judgment
or (C) such additional time as is allowed by statute or order of the
court.”).
Federal Cases: Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 09-CV-0038,
2011 WL 4499281, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (applying
definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); accord, Horton v. Williams,
08-CV-0513, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24,
2010); Lent v. Fashion Mall Partners, L.P., 243 F.R.D. 97, 100
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Diller, 678 F. Supp. 2d
288, 292, n.1 (D.N.J. 2009); Oxford v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 11-
Because of the different definitions of the term “counter-
motion,” the practice of vacillating between “cross-motion”
and “counter-motion” to refer to the same motion in the same
brief or decision, without explanation, is not recommended.
Moreover, because the term “cross-motion” appears to be com-
mon and have a generally accepted meaning, while the term
“counter-motion” is relatively rare and used in different ways,
this article will focus on the term “cross-motion,” as well as the
most common meaning of that term.
B. THREE ELEMENTS OF A “CROSS-MOTION”
The definition of a “cross-motion” that is most commonly
provided in law dictionaries, and the definition that is most
commonly applied in state and federal courts, is a competing
request for an order similar to that requested by another party
against the cross-moving party. See infra notes 7-16. As a
result, as the term is most widely understood, a “cross-motion”
has three elements. 
First, a cross-motion is a motion filed against the originally
moving party.7 Second, a cross-motion is filed by a party
138 Court Review - Volume 50  
CV-0507, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137050, at *25 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 25,
2012); S. Md. Equine Veterinary Serv. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 10-
CV-1850, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60794, at *1-2 (D. Md. June 3,
2011); Rodriguez v. Astrue, 09-CV-2668, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7049, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2010). 
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(c)
(defining a “cross-motion” as “a competing request for relief or
order similar to that requested by another party against the cross-
moving party”); D. Md. Rule 105(2)(c) (defining, in summary-
judgment context, a “cross-motion” as a motion filed “[a]fter th[e]
[original] motion has been filed” in “a two-party case”); W.D.N.Y.
L.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2)(A) (noting, in summary-judgment context, that
a “cross-motion” is against “the moving party”); cf. N.D. Cal.,
B.L.R. 7007-1(d) (“Together with an opposition, a party respond-
ing to a motion may file a counter-motion related to the subject
matter of the original motion.”). 
8. Law Dictionaries and Encyclopedias: BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1106 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a competing
request for relief or order similar to that requested by another party
against the cross-moving party . . . .”); cf. 7A FED. PROC. LAWYERS
ED. § 19:146 (2011) (“A cross-motion must be contained in the
same document as the response to the original motion, and a
response to the cross-motion must be contained in the same docu-
ment as the reply . . . .”).
State Cases: Van Horn v. Van Horn, 415 N.J. Super. 398, 409-10
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (explaining that a properly filed
cross-motion must “relate[] to the subject matter of the original
motion”); XO Communs., LLC v. Level 3 Communs., Inc., 948
A.2d 1111, 1117 (Del. Ch. 2007) (calling motion filed by respond-
ing party a “cross-motion”); accord, Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J.
Super. 91, 94 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); Nelson v. Planet Ins.
Co., 111 Nev. 1373, 1376 (Nev. 1995); Smaland Beach Ass’n v.
Genova, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 306, at *9 (Mass. May 31, 2006)
(noting that a party responding to an original motion may file a
“cross-motion or opposition”).  
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Eighth Judicial Dist. of
Nev. Civ. Rule 2.20(f) (“An opposition to a motion which contains
a motion related to the same subject matter will be considered as a
counter-motion.”); N.J. Rules of Court § 1:6-3(b) (“A cross-motion
may be filed and served by the responding party together with that
party’s opposition to the motion and noticed for the same return
date only if it relates to the subject matter of the original motion.”);
cf. Mont. D.R. Rule 4.41(G) (“Except in CSEA cases, a party served
with a motion may file a counter-motion . . . .”); Wash. State Pierce
Cnty. Super. Ct. PCLR 7(b)(1)(D)(ii) (“In the event there is an
existing motion and the responding party wishes to file a counter
motion to be heard the same date they may do so without leave of
the court . . . .”), accord, Wash. State Pierce Cnty. Super. Ct.
PCLSPR 94.04(c)(2). 
Federal Cases: Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL
4499281, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (applying definition
from Black’s Law Dictionary); Horton v. Williams, 08-CV-0513,
2010 WL 3338920, at *2 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010) (apply-
ing definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); Lent v. Fashion Mall
Partners, L.P., 243 F.R.D. 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying defin-
ition from Black’s Law Dictionary); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Diller, 678 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, n.1 (D.N.J. 2009) (applying defi-
nition from Black’s Law Dictionary); see also Willingam v. Cnty. of
Albany, 593 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.D. Cal., B.L.R.
7007-1(d) (“Together with an opposition, a party responding to a
motion may file a counter-motion related to the subject matter of
the original motion.”); D. Md. Rule 105(2)(c) (defining, in sum-
mary-judgment context, a “cross-motion” as a motion filed “[a]fter
th[e] [original] motion has been filed” in “a two-party case,” both
“opposing the first party’s motion and in support of its own cross-
motion”); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(c) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a
competing request for relief or order similar to that requested by
another party against the cross-moving party”); D. Nev. L.R.
7056(e)(1) (“A countermotion for summary judgment that relates
to the same claim or partial claim may be filed against the
movant(s) . . . .”); W.D.N.Y. L.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2)(A) (noting, in sum-
mary-judgment context, that a “cross-motion” is filed by “the party
opposing the original motion”). 
9. See Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 4499281, at *1 & n.2 (find-
ing that, where plaintiff filed motions for partial summary judg-
ment against two defendants on two trespass claims, two defen-
dants’ two motions for partial summary judgment on those two
trespass claims were each “cross-motions”).
10. See Horton, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 (“Defendant Keller’s ‘cross-
motion’ for summary judgment, which in no way opposes Defen-
dant Williams’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and
requests dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on a different basis than
does Defendant Williams’s motion, is not a cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment but is instead a motion for summary judgment.”)
[emphasis in original]; Lent, 243 F.R.D. at 100 (“[A] party cannot
file a ‘cross motion’ against a party that has not already moved
against it.”); Willingam v. Cnty. of Albany, 593 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451
(N.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that, where plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment against first two defendants, then the third
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment against the plain-
tiff, the third defendant’s motion was “improperly cast and filed as
a cross-motion rather than as a regular motion”); cf. Diller, 678 F.
Supp. 2d 288, 292 & n.1 (finding that, where plaintiff moved for
summary judgment against defendant, third-party defendant’s
motion for summary judgment against defendant was not a “cross-
motion”).
11. Law Dictionaries and Encyclopedias: BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1106 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a competing
request for relief or order similar to that requested by another party
against the cross-moving party . . . .”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIO-
NARY OF LAW 116 (1996) (defining a “cross-motion” as “[a] motion
that attempts to counter a similar motion filed by an opposing
party . . . . ”); MELLINKOFF’S DICTIONARY OF AM. LEGAL USAGE 143
(1992) (defining a “cross-motion” as an “opposing motion, usually
requesting a result opposite to original motion”); THE WOLTERS
against whom the original motion was filed.8
Example 1: Defendant moves for summary judgment
against Plaintiff, then Plaintiff moves for summary
judgment against Defendant. Plaintiff’s motion is a
“cross-motion.”9
Example 2: Defendant 1 moves for summary judg-
ment against Plaintiff, then Defendant 2 moves for
summary judgment against Plaintiff. Defendant 2’s
motion is not a “cross-motion.”10
Third, a cross-motion requests an order that is similar to, or
competes with, the order requested by another party.11
Example 1: Plaintiff moves for summary judgment
on its first claim (as well as its other claims), then
Defendant moves for partial summary judgment on
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KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 714 (2011) (defining “cross-
motion” as “[a] motion similar to a motion filed earlier by another
party. A cross motion is a motion for some ruling or order filed by
a party to an action that is similar in its request to another motion
already pending. . . . Note: a cross-motion must seek the same
order or similar relief or ruling as a prior motion, with the cross-
motion seeking an order or rule to the benefit of the cross-movant,
while the original movant sought the original order for its own
benefit.”); Lawyers.com Legal Dictionary, http://research.
lawyers.com/glossary/cross-motion.html (defining a “cross-
motion” as “a motion that attempts to counter a similar motion
filed by an opposing party . . . .”); WILLIAM C. BURTON, BURTON’S
LEGAL THESAURUS 136 (3d ed. 1999) (defining “cross” as to “con-
flict with . . . contradict, contravene, controvert . . . oppose . . . [and]
run counter to . . . ,” and listing “cross-motions” under the words
“Associated Concepts”). 
State Cases: Berger v. Pubco Corp., 76 A.2d 132, 135 (Del. 2009)
(referring to a motion for summary judgment filed in response to
a motion to dismiss as a “counter-motion” and a motion for sum-
mary judgment filed in response to a motion for summary judg-
ment as a “cross-motion”); Columbus Steel Castings Co. v. Transp.
& Transit Assocs., No. 06AP-1247, 2007 WL 4340558, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2007) (“TTA made a competing request for relief
by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment.”); Dillon v. Typal-
dos, 2006 WL 1381625, at *1, 6, 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May
19, 2006) (referring to a motion to dismiss a complaint filed in
response to a motion to reinstate the complaint as a “cross-motion”
and a subsequent motion to add defendants as a “counter
motion”). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Eighth Judicial Dist. of
Nev. Civ. Rule 2.20(f) (“An opposition to a motion which contains
a motion related to the same subject matter will be considered as a
counter-motion.”); N.J. Rules of Court § 1:6-3(b) (“A cross-motion
may be filed and served by the responding party together with that
party’s opposition to the motion and noticed for the same return
date only if it relates to the subject matter of the original motion.”).
Federal Cases: Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 09-CV-0038,
2011 WL 4499281, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (applying
definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); Horton v. Williams, 08-CV-
0513, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010)
(applying definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); Lent v. Fashion
Mall Partners, L.P., 243 F.R.D. 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying
definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Diller, 678 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, n.1 (D.N.J. 2009) (applying defi-
nition from Black’s Law Dictionary); see also Birmingham v. Mizuno
USA, Inc., 09-CV-0566, 2011 WL 1299356, at *2 & n.1 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2011); Ramos v. Bonilla, No. 03-2683, 2006 WL 4452844,
at *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2006); FDIC v. Modular Homes, Inc.,
859 F. Supp. 117, 125 & n.8 (D.N.J. 1994); Mulee v. United States,
648 F. Supp. 1181, 1182 & n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: D. Haw. L.R. 7.9 (“Any
motion raising the same subject matter as an original motion may
be filed by the responding party together with the party’s opposition
. . . . A party’s memorandum in support of the counter motion must
be combined into one document with the party’s memorandum in
opposition to the original motion . . . .”); D. Haw. LBR 9013-1(d)(1)
(“A respondent may file, together with the response to the motion,
a countermotion raising only the same specific issues, claims, or
defenses presented in the original motion.”); D.N.J. L.R. 7.1(h)
(requiring a “cross-motion” to be “related to the subject-matter of
the original motion”); D.N.J. L. Bankr. R. 9013-1(d) (“No motion
shall be designated a cross motion unless it is related to the original
motion.”); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(c) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a
competing request for relief or order similar to that requested by
another party against the cross-moving party”); D. Nev. L.R.
7056(e)(1) (“A countermotion for summary judgment that relates
to the same claim or partial claim [as the original motion for sum-
mary judgment] may be filed against the movant(s) . . . .”); cf. N.D.
Cal., B.L.R. 7007-1(d) (“Together with an opposition, a party
responding to a motion may file a counter-motion related to the
subject matter of the original motion.”); E.D. Cal. Order 13-0911(e)
(“Any counter-motion or other motion that a party may desire to
make that is related to the general subject matter of the original
motion shall be served and filed in the manner and on the date pre-
scribed for the filing of opposition.”); E.D. Cal. LBR 9014-1(i)
(“Any countermotion or other motion related to the general subject
matter of the original motion set for hearing pursuant to this Local
Rule may be filed and served no later than the time opposition to
the original motion is required to be filed.”). 
12. See Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 4499281, at *1 & n.2 (find-
ing that, where plaintiff filed motions for partial summary judg-
ment against two defendants on two trespass claims, two defen-
dants’ two motions for partial summary judgment on those two
trespass claims were each “cross-motions”).
13. See Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 4499281, at *1 & n.2 (find-
ing that, where plaintiff filed motion for partial summary judgment
against first defendant on two trespass claims, first defendant’s
motion for partial summary judgment on those two trespass claims
was a “cross-motion,” but first defendant’s motion for partial sum-
mary judgment on plaintiff’s third claim, for conversion, was a
“motion”; also finding that, where plaintiff filed motion for partial
summary judgment against second defendant on two trespass
claims, second defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment
on those two trespass claims was a “cross-motion,” but second
defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s
third claim, for conversion, was a “motion,” as was second defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint); Birmingham v.
Mizuno USA, Inc., 09-CV-0566, 2011 WL 1299356, at *2 & n.1
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (“The reason the Court does not charac-
terize Defendant’s motion as a ‘cross-motion’ is that it seeks relief
that appears predominantly dissimilar to that requested by Plain-
tiffs, who moved for summary judgment on only three of the seven
counts of their Complaint.”); Horton, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 &
n.2 (finding that second defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment against plaintiff, filed after first defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint, was not a “cross-motion”); Diller, 678 F.
Supp. 2d 288, 292 (finding that, where plaintiff moved for sum-
mary judgment against defendant, defendant’s motion for partial
summary judgment against plaintiff was a “cross-motion,” but
defendant’s motion for leave to file sur-reply on its motion for par-
tial summary judgment was not a “cross-motion,” nor was third-
party defendant’s motion for summary judgment against defendant
Plaintiff’s first claim. Defendant’s motion is a “cross-
motion.”12
Example 2: Defendant moves for partial summary
judgment on Claim 2 (which seeks X as relief), then
Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on
Claim 3 (which seeks Y as relief). Plaintiff’s motion is
not a “cross-motion.”13
Granted, in some courts, a cross-motion may seek relief that
is unresponsive or unrelated to the relief sought in the original
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a “cross-motion”); Ramos v. Bonilla, No. 03-2683, 2006 WL
4452844, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2006) (“Ramos’s cross-
motion [seeking to revoke a discharge from bankruptcy, as well as
for sanctions and damages] is procedurally improper . . . because
it does not relate to the original motion to dismiss filed by
Bonilla.”); FDIC v. Modular Homes, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 117, 125 &
n.8 (D.N.J. 1994) (“[Modular’s] cross-motion [to dismiss the
FDIC’s complaint for failing to comply with discovery] is procedu-
rally improper . . . because it does not relate to the subject matter
of the FDIC’s motion to dismiss Modular’s affirmative defenses.”);
Mulee v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1181, 1182 & n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (“Although the government has styled its motion as to
Mulee’s complaint as one for dismissal, it is more properly a cross-
motion for summary judgment in its favor and denial of Mulee’s
motion for summary judgment.”).
14. State Cases: Burke Secur., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 184
A.D.2d 1046, 1046 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (“Brownyard’s cross
motion was proper even though plaintiffs, in making the original
motion, did not seek any relief against Brownyard.”); cf. Van Horn
v. Van Horn, 415 N.J. Super. 398, 409-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010) (explaining that a properly filed cross-motion responds to
the subject matter of the original motion, but noting that the judge
has the discretion to relax the rules, and deeming a non-responsive
motion to be a cross-motion).
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.J. Rules of Court, §
1:6-3(b) (“[I]n Family Part motions brought under Part V of these
Rules . . . [,] a notice of cross-motion may seek relief unrelated to
that sought in the original motion.”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2215(b)
(McKinney 2010) (“[The] relief [sought in the cross-motion] need
not be responsive to that demanded by the moving party.”); Patrick
M. Connors, Practice Commentaries, in MCKINNEY’S CONS. LAWS OF
N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C2215:1, at 149 (“A cross-motion is merely a
motion by any party against the party who made the original
motion, made returnable at the same time as the original
motion.”); Patrick M. Connors, Practice Commentaries, in MCKIN-
NEY’S CONS. LAWS OF N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C2215:1D, at 185 (“The
relief sought in the cross-motion need not be responsive or even
related to the relief sought in the main motion. It can be of an
entirely different kind.”). 
Federal Case: Kowalski v. Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, 05-CV-
00679, 2008 WL 4216267, at *1 (D. Haw. Sept. 15, 2008) (draw-
ing distinction between a counter-motion and a cross-motion, not-
ing that the former refers to a motion raising the same subject mat-
ter as an original motion, and the latter refers to an “independent”
motion unrelated to the subject matter of the original motion).
Federal Rule: U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Haw. L.R. 7.9
(“Counter Motions. . . . Any motion raising the same subject mat-
ter as an original motion may be filed by the responding party
together with the party’s opposition . . . .”).    
15. State Cases: Linn v. Linn, 8 So.2d 187, 188 (Alaska 1942); Kitch
v. Moslander, 50 N.E.2d 933, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943); Ryan v.
City of Emmetsburg, 293 N.W. 29, 31 (Iowa 1940); Donovan v.
Donovan, 200 N.E. 884, 886 (Mass. 1936); State ex rel. McVay v.
Dist. Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 251 P.2d 840, 846 (Mont.
1952); Kress v. Corey, 189 P.2d 352, 361-62 (Nev. 1948); N.
Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 195 P. 988, 989 (Wyo. 1921). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: See NY Westchester
County Justice Tolbert Rules Doc. 1 (“Cross-motions which seek
only the denial of the relief in the original motion will not be rec-
ognized as motions with respect to which a reply may be submit-
ted.”). 
Federal Cases: C.H.R.I.S.T., Inc. v. Meyers, 00-CV-50402, 2002
WL 257814, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2002) (“[A] separate motion
to deny an opposing party’s motion for summary judgment is obvi-
ously unnecessary.”); Kan.-Neb. Natural Gas Co. v. City of St.
Edward, Neb., 135 F. Supp. 629, 633 (D. Neb. 1955) (“The defen-
dants in each case served and filed a motion to deny motion of
plaintiff for temporary injunction. Such a pleading is of no real ser-
vice. A motion to deny an antecedent motion already set for hear-
ing accomplishes nothing that could not be done by a simple
appearance in resistance to the earlier motion. Reasonable profes-
sional case is laudable. When it degenerates into illogical timidity
it approaches the status of absurdity.”); Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
00-CV-0368, 2001 WL 1597851, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2001)
(“Although styled as a Motion to Deny Summary Judgment, Plain-
tiff’s motion is in essence a response to Defendant’s summary judg-
ment motion. In light of Plaintiff’s response, a separate motion to
deny summary judgment is unnecessary, and accordingly Plaintiff’s
Motion to Deny Summary Judgment is denied as moot.”); Jones v.
Milwaukee Cnty., 74-C-0374,1979 WL 2035, at *5 (E.D. Wis. May
1, 1979) (“The defendants filed a motion to deny the plaintiffs’
motion for partial summary judgment. To oppose a motion, it is
only necessary to file a brief or affidavits in opposition. A motion
to deny the motion opposed is unnecessary. The defendants’
motion is superfluous and will therefore be dismissed.”); cf. Carl-
wood Dev. Inc. v. United States, 10-CV-1773, 2011 WL 69374, at
*1 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2011) (characterizing as improper govern-
ment’s purported “cross-motion” for summary judgment because it
did not “address[] any matters even remotely indicative of a
motion for summary judgment” but rather merely responded to
the matters raised by the petitioners in their opening brief on their
motion); Langley v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 96-CV-3107, 1998
WL 792498, at *1, n.1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 1998) (“Plaintiff filed on
October 23, 1998 a motion to deny defendant’s motion to strike
and deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment. These plead-
ings are improper under the court’s local civil rules. The pertinent
rule provides only for the filing of a motion and brief, a response,
and a reply.”).
16. State Cases: Dillon v. Typaldos, 2006 WL 1381625, at *1, 6, 13
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May 19, 2006) (referring to a motion to
dismiss a complaint filed in response to a motion to reinstate the
complaint as a “cross-motion” and a subsequent motion to add
defendants as a “counter motion”). 
Federal Cases: Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d
229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007) (characterizing plaintiff’s motion to
amend, filed in attempt to cure defects identified in defendants’
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[b][6] as a “cross-
motion”); accord, Andre v. Walgreen Co., 12-CV-5413, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 88657, at *1-2 (D.N.J. June 25, 2013); Lesperance v.
Cnty. of St. Lawrence, 10-CV-1273, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92439,
motion.14 However, this is the minority view. Compare note 14
with notes 11-13.
Note that, while cross-motions must seek relief that com-
petes with the relief sought in the original motion, cross-
motions to “deny” or “dismiss” those original motions are
superfluous and improper because they request no relief other
than that which may be provided through a decision of the
original motions.15
Note also that a motion to amend a pleading is a cross-
motion if, and only if, that motion seeks (through the pro-
posed amendment) to remedy the defects in the original plead-
ing identified in the motion to dismiss.16
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at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2011); Deluca v. AccessIT Group, Inc.,
695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Coulter v. United States
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 07-CV-4894, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73014, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2008); Steiert v. Mata Servs., 111 F.
Supp. 2d 521, 523 (D.N.J. 2000).
17. State Cases: Grande v. Peteroy, 39 A.D.3d 590, 591-592 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007) (“[A]n untimely motion or cross motion for summary
judgment may be considered by the court where, as here, a timely
motion for summary judgment was made on nearly identical
grounds [because] the nearly identical nature of the grounds may
provide the requisite good cause (see CPLR 3212 [a]) to review the
untimely motion or cross motion on the merits.”); Filannino v. Tri-
borough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 34 A.D.3d 280, 281 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006) (“A cross motion for summary judgment made after the
expiration of the [deadline for making dispositive motions] may be
considered by the court, even in the absence of good cause, where
a timely motion for summary judgment was made seeking relief
‘nearly identical’ to that sought by the cross motion.”).
Federal Cases: Daly v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 00-CV-0040, 2002
WL 1768887, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2002) (permitting plaintiff to
file cross-motion for summary judgment after expiration of
motion-filing deadline); Mobley v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 11-C-
1293, 2012 WL 3028031, at *1 & n.1 (W.D. Okla. July 24, 2012)
(“Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s Motion and also filed a
counter Motion for Summary Judgment . . . . Defendant’s failure to
file a separate motion for summary judgment is in violation of the
local rules. . . . However, because the deadline for filing dispositive
motions has passed . . . , the Court will consider Defendant’s
Motion despite this shortcoming.”); Jones v. Coleman Co., 39 F.3d
749, 753 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming the decision of a magistrate to
judge to allow an untimely cross-motion where there was a
“change in circumstances whereby the issues involving the only
remaining defendant [were] addressed by the motion” that showed
“good cause”); Hahnel v. United States, 782 F. Supp. 2d 20, 30-31
(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (“This Court has routinely permitted litigants to
file a cross-motion in response to a dispositive motion, even
though the deadline for filing dispositive motions had passed, pro-
vided that such cross-motions were filed by the deadline estab-
lished for filing opposing papers, as set by the Court’s Motion
Scheduling Order. . . . The Court cannot recall an instance, though,
where a cross-motion was filed after all filing deadlines had
expired, as in this case, and it notes its disapproval of the manner
in which Plaintiff’s motion was filed. Nevertheless, the Court will,
for its own convenience, and in its discretion, consider Plaintiff’s
cross-motion . . . .”). 
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: Rules Ct. Fed. Claims
7.2(c)(1) (“A cross-motion may be filed within the time allowed
for responses [to motions].”); E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(e)
(“Any counter-motion or other motion that a party may desire to
make that is related to the general subject matter of the original
motion shall be served and filed with the Clerk in the manner and
on the date prescribed for the filing of opposition.”); N.D.N.Y. L.R.
7.1(c) (“A party may file and serve a cross-motion (meaning a
competing request for relief or order similar to that requested by
another party against the cross-moving party) at the time it files
and serves its opposition papers to the original motion”). 
18. State Cases: Schacht v. Ameritrust Co. N.A., 1994 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1125, at *15-16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (affirming lower
court’s decision to strike cross-motion for summary judgment filed
after deadline for all dispositive motions); Cruickshank v. Fremont
Inv. & Loan, 307 Ga. App. 489, 489-90 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
(affirming dismissal of untimely filed cross-motion for summary
judgment).  
Federal Cases: Baker v. AirServ Corp., 08-CV-0913, 2009 WL
1098767, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009) (“[P]laintiff’s only expla-
nation for filing his motion for partial summary judgment after the
dispositive motion deadline amounts to a misreading of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). He offers no support for his position
that Rule 56(a) permits him to file a cross-motion for summary
judgment out of time, nor can I find any.”); Kelley v. N.Y. Life Ins.
& Annuity Corp., 07-CV-01702, 2008 WL 5423343, at *4 (D.
Colo. Dec. 30, 2008) (“I first note that his Cross-Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was filed on November 11, 2008, after the dis-
positive motions deadline set by the scheduling order had passed
on October 20, 2008. As such, his motion is untimely.”); Schroer v.
United States, 07-CV-0690, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64568, at *1-2
(D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2008) (striking cross-motion for summary judg-
ment that was filed as a response after dispositive motion deadline
passed); United States ex rel. IBM v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 112 F.
Supp. 2d 1023, 1028-29 (D. Haw. 2000) (declining to consider
“cross-motion” for summary judgment filed “well after the court
imposed deadline[,]” noting that, before the dispositive motion
deadline expired, Defendant could have “request[ed] that the court
modify its Scheduling Order, []or . . . [sought] relief from the
Scheduling Order”); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 96-CV-
0824, 1998 WL 35235446, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 23, 1998) (grant-
ing motion “to strike plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judg-
ment as untimely . . . under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f).”); Serino v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of Am., 706 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586-87 (M.D. Pa.
2009) (striking “cross-motion” for summary judgment that was
filed after the expiration of the dispositive-motion deadline, even
though it was filed within the deadline to file a response to the
original motion for summary judgment); Falk v. Wells Fargo Bank,
09-CV-0678, 2011 WL 3702666, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2011)
(“Wells Fargo moves to strike Falk’s Cross-Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment. The deadline for filing dispositive motions was
December 10, 2010. . . . On January 10, 2011, Falk submitted his
Cross-Motion as part of his Response to Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment. Falk’s only explanation for failing to file his
motion by, or request an extension of, the dispositive motions
deadline is that it was the result of ‘inadvertence or because he had
not previously thought of filing a Cross-Motion.’ . . . Finding no
good cause to extend the dispositive motions deadline, the Court
STRIKES Falk’s untimely pleading pursuant to Federal Rule
16(f)(1)(c).”); cf. Byce v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 09-CV-1912, 2011
WL 233390, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2011) (finding that cross-
motion for summary judgment filed after expiration of dispositive-
motion filing deadline was untimely and had to qualify for excep-
tion to be considered); Wuliger v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 03-
CV-7699, 2011 WL 767872, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2011) (find-
ing that cross-motion for summary judgment filed after expiration
of dispositive-motion filing deadline violated the court’s schedul-
ing order but would be excused under the circumstances); Seebach
v. Seebach Am., Inc., 09-CV-0326, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107568
II. PROCEDURAL RULES REGARDING CROSS-MOTIONS
A. COMMON PROCEDURAL RULES REGARDING
CROSS-MOTIONS
Sometimes, cross-motions are allowed to be filed after the
expiration of the motion-filing deadline.17 Other times, how-
ever, cross-motions are not allowed to be filed after the expira-
tion of the motion-filing deadline.18
Sometimes, the brief in support of a cross-motion must be
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(S.D. W. Va. Oct. 7, 2010) (considering arguments raised to the
extent they are in response to motion for summary judgment, but
deeming “cross-motion” to be untimely, and therefore striking
cross motion for summary judgment).
19. Law Dictionaries and Encyclopedias: 7A FED. PROC. LAWYERS ED.
§ 19:146 (2011) (“A cross-motion must be contained in the same
document as the response to the original motion, and a response to
the cross-motion must be contained in the same document as the
reply . . . .”). 
Federal Cases: Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 09-CV-0038,
2011 WL 4499281, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (“Such a bifur-
cated motion practice is prohibited by [the court’s local rule on
page limitations]. . . . The effect of this motion practice was . . . [to]
enlarge[] the number of pages of memoranda of law that Defen-
dant Elexco could submit regarding Plaintiffs’ two trespass claims
. . . .”); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 375, 377
(U.S. Cl. Ct. 1988) (reciting court rule that “a party filing a cross-
motion is required to file its argument in support of the cross-
motion and in response to the other parties motion in the same
brief”); Big Lagoon Rancheria v. Cal., 09-CV-1471, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47109, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2010) (“Big Lagoon’s dis-
positive motion is currently due June 17, 2010; the State’s opposi-
tion and any cross-motion, contained in a single brief, are due July
1, 2010; Big Lagoon’s reply and cross-opposition, contained in a
single brief, are due July 15, 2010; and the State’s reply on its cross-
motion is due July 22, 2010.”); Love v. Correa, 07-CV-0436, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10544, at *41-42 (D. Haw. Feb. 11, 2009) (noting
that “Defendants Fontes and Wu violated Local Rule 7.9 by filing
separate oppositions and replies”).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: D. Haw. L.R. 7.9 (“A
party’s memorandum in support of the counter motion must be
combined into one document with the party’s memorandum in
opposition to the original motion . . . .”); D. Md. Civ. Rule
105(2)(c) (“After that motion has been filed, the other party shall
file a cross-motion accompanied by a single memorandum (both
opposing the first party’s motion and in support of its own cross-
motion) . . . .”); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(c) (“If a party makes a cross-
motion, it must join its cross motion brief with its opposition brief,
and this combined brief may not exceed twenty-five (25) pages in
length, exclusive of exhibits. A separate brief in opposition to the
original motion is not permissible.”); U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.D.N.Y.,
Berman-Practices 2.C.2. (“Any cross-motion shall be included in
the opposition brief.”); cf. D.N.J. L.R. 7.1(h) (“A cross-motion
related to the subject matter of the original motion may be filed by
the party opposing the motion together with that party’s opposition
papers . . . .”); U.S. Court of Claims Rule 83.2(e) (stating that a
party filing a cross-motion is required to file its argument in sup-
port of the cross-motion and in response to the other parties’
motion in the same brief).
20. State Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.M. Dist. Ct. Rule 1-
007.1(E) (“Responses to motions shall be made separately from
any counter-motions or cross-motions.”); N.M. Fourth Judicial
Dist. Ct. LR4-304(E) (“The practice of filing cross-motions which
operate as both a motion and as a response or reply to the original
motion is prohibited.”); N.M. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. LR6-204(C)
(“The practice of filing cross-motions to operate as both a motion
and as a response to the original motion is prohibited.”).  
Federal Cases: World Publ’g Co. v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
09-CV-0574, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32594, at *25 (N.D. Okla. Mar.
28, 2011) (considering defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s
opposition based on the argument that, “to the extent it purports
to be a cross-motion for summary judgment[,] it violates Northern
District of Oklahoma Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)[,]” which prohibits a
response to a motion to include a cross-motion, and ultimately
converting the response into a cross-motion); Mobley v. Am. Home
Assur. Co., 11-C-1293, 2012 WL 3028031, at *1 & n.1 (W.D.
Okla. July 24, 2012) (“Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s Motion
and also filed a counter Motion for Summary Judgment . . . . Defen-
dant’s failure to file a separate motion for summary judgment is in
violation of the local rules. . . . Combined motions are generally
stricken.”); Tooling, Mfg. & Techs. Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
08-CV-11812, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89273, at *8 n.5 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 30, 2010) (“[A] cross-motion must be filed independently of
the response brief, though nothing would prohibit using the same
brief for the response brief and the brief supporting the cross-
motion.”). 
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: D. Colo. L. Civ. R.
56.1(B) (“A cross motion for summary judgment shall not be
included in a response brief.”); E.D. Mich. ECF Rule 5(e) (“[A]
response or reply to a motion must not be combined with a
counter-motion.”); D. Miss., L.U. Civ. R. 7(b)(3)(C) (“A response
to a motion may not include a counter-motion in the same docu-
ment. Any motion must be an item docketed separately from a
response.”); New Mex. L.R. 1-007.1(E) (“Responses to motions
shall be made separately from any counter-motions or cross-
motions.”); E.D. Okla. L.R. 7.1(f) (“A response to a motion may
not also include a motion or a cross-motion made by the respond-
ing party.”); N.D. Okla. L.R. 7.2(e) (“A response to a motion may
not also include a motion or a cross-motion made by the respond-
ing party.”); W.D. Okla. L. Cv. R. 7.1(c) (“A response to a motion
may not also include a motion or a cross-motion made by the
responding party. If a party responding to a motion files a cross-
motion or other closely-related motion concurrently with the filing
of the response, the brief in support of the cross-motion or other
closely-related motion may be combined with the responsive brief
[or it may be filed separately].”) (emphasis added); U.S. Dist. Ct.
Rules N.D. W. Va. 10.1 (“Always file motions and responses sepa-
rately. For example, never file a cross-motion for summary judg-
ment with a response to a motion for summary judgment. It is crit-
ical that the cross motion be filed separately so that it will appear
on the Court’s Pending Motions Report and can be properly linked
to any subsequent responses, replies, notices and orders.”); U.S.
Dist. Ct. Rules S.D. W. Va. 10.1 (“Motions and responses must be
filed as separate documents. For example, a cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment should never be combined with a response to a
motion for summary judgment. It is critical that the cross motion
be filed separately so that it can be properly linked to any subse-
quent responses, replies, notices and orders.”).
21. State Cases: Captain Andy’s Sailing v. Dep’t of Land & Natural
Res., 113 Haw. 184, 190 (Haw. 2006); Watson v. YMCA of Greater
Boston, 14 LCR 528, 529 (Mass. Land Ct. 2006). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Mass. Land Court Rule
4 (“Responses to motions or cross-motions . . . must be served
upon all other parties and filed with the court within thirty (30)
days after service of the motion or cross-motion. . . . Reply briefs,
affidavits and other materials in support of the reply (if any) must
combined with the brief in opposition to the original motion.19
Other times, however, the brief in support of a cross-motion
may, or sometimes must, be filed separately from the brief in
opposition to the original motion.20
Sometimes, replies on cross-motions are permitted without
prior leave of the court.21
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be served on the parties and filed with the court no later than ten
(10) days prior to the date the court first set for hearing . . . .”);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2214(b) (providing that, where answering papers
and a cross-motion are required to be served seven days in advance
of the return day, “any reply or responding affidavits shall be served
at least one day before such time”); Ohio Second District Local
Appellate Rule 8(F)(2) (“A reply brief, if any, and/or a response to
the cross-motion, if any, shall be filed within twenty (20) days after
the filing of the brief in opposition to the motion. No other briefs
or memorandum shall be filed except with leave of court, unless a
cross-motion has been filed in which event the movant may file a
reply within twenty (20) day[s] of the filing of opposing party’s
response.”), accord, Eleventh District Local Appellate Rule
101(B)(1); Utah Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 101(g) (“The reply to the
response to the counter motion shall be filed and served at least 2
business days before the hearing.”).
Federal Cases: Young v. Thieblot Ryan, P.A., 11-CV-1562, 2012
WL 6698632, at *1 & n.3 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2012); Small v. Bud-
Kworldwide, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 2d 438, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Tac-
cetta v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 10-CV-6194, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90683, at *1 (D.N.J. June 29, 2012); Cnty. of Inyo v. Dep’t
of the Interior, 06-CV-1502, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135831, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010); Strong v. Horton Plaza, LP, 09-CV-2901,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86885, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2010);
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 07-CV-1958, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47413, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2008).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.D. Cal. Gen. Order
61 Regarding Immigration Mandamus Cases (“[I]f plaintiff filed a
counter-motion, plaintiff may serve and file a reply within 14 days
of service of defendant’s opposition.”); N.D. Cal., B.L.R. 7007-1(e)
(“Any reply to an opposition, or opposition to a counter-motion,
shall be filed and served by the moving party at least 7 days before
the hearing.”); D. Haw. L.R. 7.9 (“The movant on a counter motion
shall file and serve any reply . . . .”); W.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 7(b)(2)(A)
(“If the party opposing the original motion files a cross-motion,
. . . the party filing the cross-motion shall have fourteen days after
service of the responding papers to file and serve reply papers in
support of the cross-motion.”); D. Md. Civ. Rule 105(2)(c) (“After
that motion has been filed, the other party shall file a cross-motion
. . . , the first party shall then file an opposition/reply, and the sec-
ond party may then file a reply.”). 
22. State Case: Rizz Mgt. Inc. v. Kemper Ins. Co., 791 N.Y.S.2d 873, at
*3-5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.J. Rules of Court. §
1:6-3(b) (“No reply papers may be served or filed by the cross-
movant without leave of court.”); NY Commercial Division
Westchester County Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules Doc. 2
(“Sur-reply papers, including reply papers in support of a cross-
motion, are not permitted, absent prior permission of the Court.”);
Kentucky Rules of Civ. Proc. Rule 76.21 (“No reply to a cross
response shall be filed unless requested by the court.”). 
Federal Cases: Cross v. Potter, 09-CV-1293, 2013 WL 1149525,
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013) (enforcing proscription against fil-
ing replies on cross-motions without prior leave of the court);
accord, Cross v. State Farm Ins. Co., 10-CV-1179, 2013 WL
665002, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2013); Werking v. Andrews, 11-
CV-0410, 2012 WL 2885424, at *2, n.5 (N.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012);
Planck v. Schenectady Cnty., 12-CV-0336, 2012 WL 1977972, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012); Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 09-
CV-0038, 2011 WL 4499281, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011);
Valentine v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 12-CV-0647, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 83680, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2012); Speth v.
Goode, 95-CV-0264, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101021, at *42 (D.N.J.
July 19, 2013) (stating that “Plaintiff’s reply in support of his
cross-motion . . . was filed without permission of the Court in vio-
lation of L. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(3)”).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R.
16-5 (“Plaintiff may serve and file a reply within 14 days after ser-
vice of defendant’s opposition or counter-motion. Unless the Court
orders otherwise, . . . [this] . . . conclu[des] . . . [the] briefing
schedule . . . .”); D.N.J. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(3) (“No reply papers shall be
filed, unless permitted by the Court, relating to the following
motions: Cross [motions] under L. Civ. R. 7.1(h) . . . .”); N.D.N.Y.
L.R. 7.1(c) (“The cross-moving party may not reply in further sup-
port of its cross-motion without the Court’s prior permission.”); D.
Nev. L.R. 7056(d) (“Unless otherwise ordered, there is no reply to
a countermotion [for summary judgment] under subsection
(e)(1).”); cf. W.D. Wash. L.C.R. 7(k) (“The court may order parties
filing cross motions for summary judgment to combine their mem-
oranda and forego reply briefs in exchange for an enlarged
response brief.”).
23. State Cases: Ex parte Novaris Pharms. Corp., 975 So.2d 297, 300,
n.2 (Ala. 2007) (“[T]he Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure . . . were
patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Sears v.
Doty, 92 A.2d 604, 604 (Del. 1952) (noting that “Superior Court
Rule 30(h) is copied from a local rule adopted by certain Federal
District Courts.”); Fletcher v. Limeco Corp., 996 So.2d 773, 779
(Miss. 2008) (“[T]he Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, with
few exceptions, were developed to comport with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.”); Univ. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 471
S.W.2d 28, 36, n.5 (Tex. 1971) (dissent) (noting that the trial court
judge’s procedure for dismissing the case was “akin to if not taken
from the ‘automatic’ dismissal procedures which have been fol-
lowed for many years under local rules of federal district courts”). 
Federal Case: Blue v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 562 F. Supp. 2d 33, 41
n.6 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [13(a)] is
materially identical to Superior Court Rule 13(a) . . . .”). 
24. State Cases: Ex parte Novaris Pharms. Corp., 975 So.2d 297, 300,
n.2 (Ala. 2007) (“Federal cases construing the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are persuasive authority in construing the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure, which were patterned after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Fletcher v. Limeco Corp., 996 So.2d
773, 779 (Miss. 2008) (finding “highly persuasive” a federal dis-
trict court’s decisions interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) and an
accompanying federal court local rule, given that “the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure, with few exceptions, were developed to
Other times, however, replies on cross-motions are not per-
mitted without prior leave of the court.22
B. USEFULNESS OF FEDERAL RULES IN 
INTERPRETING STATE RULES 
State court procedural rules are occasionally patterned after
federal court procedural rules.23 When the state court proce-
dural rules are patterned after federal court procedural rules,
federal cases construing the federal rules are persuasive
authority in construing the state rules.24
III. COMMON PROBLEMS CAUSED BY MISUNDER-
STANDINGS OF A CROSS-MOTION
Misunderstandings regarding the definition of a cross-
motion often lead to problems during the filing and briefing of
cross-motions, including (1) a violation of the action’s motion-
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comport with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); Hrehorovich
v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App. 772, 788 n.5 (1992)
(“Maryland courts have frequently stated that when a local rule
and a federal rule are similar, federal court decisions interpreting
the federal rule are especially persuasive authority in interpreting
the local rule.”).
Federal Case: Blue v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 562 F. Supp. 2d 33, 41
n.6 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[F]ederal court decisions interpreting the fed-
eral rule may be considered ‘persuasive authority’ in interpreting
the local rule.”).
25. See Horton, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 & n.2 (“Defendant Keller’s
‘cross-motion’ for summary judgment . . . is not a cross-motion for
summary judgment but is instead a motion for summary judg-
ment. As a result, Defendant Keller was required to file this dis-
positive motion by February 26, 2010. . . . However, Defendant
Keller filed his motion April 19, 2010, fifty-two (52) days after the
expiration of the disposition-motion filing deadline.”); Serino v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 706 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586-87 (M.D. Pa.
2009) (striking “cross-motion” filed after the expiration of the dis-
positive-motion deadline but within the deadline to file a response
to the original motion for summary judgment); Baker v. AirServ
Corp., 08-CV-0913, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33443, at *1-3 (D. Colo.
Apr. 20, 2009); Kelley v. N. Y. Life Ins. & Annuity Corp., 07-CV-
01702, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104750, at *11 (D. Colo. Dec. 30,
2008); Schroer v. United States, 07-CV-0690, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64568, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2008).
26. See, e.g., D.N.H. L.R. 7.1(e)(2) (prohibiting filing of reply on
nondispositive motions), accord, D.N.H. L.B.R. 7102(b)(2), D.
Minn. L.R. 7.1(b)(3), N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(2); see also N.D.N.Y.
L.R. 7.1(c) (proscribing filing of reply on cross-motions even when
cross-motions are dispositive in nature), accord, D.N.J. Civ. R.
7.1(d)(3); cf. W.D. Wash. L.C.R. 7(k); S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1, Advisory
Committee Comments.
27. See, e.g., C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-10; D. Del. L.R. 7.1.2(b); S.D. Fla. L.R.
7.1(c); D. Haw. L.B.R. 9013-1(c)(2); D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(6);
D.N.H. 7.1(e)(3); D.N.M. LR-Civ 7.4(b); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(1);
S.D. Ohio L.R. 7.2(a)(2); N.D. W. Va. L.R. Civ. P. 7.02(b)(3); S.D.
W. Va. L.R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(7); D. Utah L.R. 7(b)(3).
28. See Carlwood Dev. Inc. v. United States, 10-CV-1773, 2011 WL
69374, at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2011) (denying petitioner’s motion
to strike government’s improper “cross-motion”–which did not
“address[] any matters even remotely indicative of a motion for
summary judgment” but rather merely responded to the matters
raised by the petitioners in their opening brief—because “rather
than striking any portion of the [‘cross-motion’] itself, the Court
will merely construe [it] as only a response to the [petitioner’s]
opening brief, and not a cross-motion,” and strike the govern-
ment’s unauthorized reply on its improper cross-motion as “noth-
ing more than a disingenuous attempt to get the last word”).
filing deadline, (2) a violation of the court’s proscription
against the filing of replies on cross-motions, (3) a violation of
the court’s proscription against the filing of sur-replies on dis-
positive motions, and (4) a violation of the court’s page limita-
tion on memoranda of law.
A. VIOLATION OF THE MOTION-FILING DEADLINE
Almost always, courts have (through scheduling orders
and/or case-management plans) a deadline on the filing of
motions. A litigant’s misunderstanding of what a cross-motion
is can lead the litigant to violate that motion-filing deadline. 
Example: The deadline for filing dispositive motions
is February 1. On January 31, Plaintiff moves for sum-
mary judgment on Claims 1 and 2 (seeking monetary
relief). On February 18, Defendant files a response to
Plaintiff’s motion, combined with a “cross-motion” to
dismiss Claim 3 (seeking injunctive relief) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendant’s motion on Claim 3 is not a “cross-
motion” but a motion (because it seeks relief different
from that requested by Plaintiff in its original motion).
As a result, while Defendant’s response is timely,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is untimely.25
B. VIOLATION OF THE RULE AGAINST FILING
REPLIES ON CROSS-MOTIONS
Often courts have (through a local rule of practice, standing
order, and/or case-management plan) a proscription against fil-
ing a reply on a cross-motion without prior leave of the court
when the cross-motion is non-dispositive in nature, and occa-
sionally even when the cross-motion is dispositive in nature.26
A litigant’s misunderstanding of what a cross-motion is can
lead the litigant to violate a court’s proscription against filing
replies on cross-motions.
Example: The court has a local rule proscribing the
filing of replies on cross-motions. Plaintiff files a
motion for summary judgment on Claims 1 and 2.
Defendant files a response and separate “motion” for
summary judgment on Claims 1 and 2. Plaintiff files
a response to Defendant’s “motion” combined with a
reply on its own motion. Defendant then attempts to
file a reply on its own “motion” without prior leave.
Defendant has violated the court’s local rule proscrib-
ing the filing of replies on cross-motions.
C. VIOLATION OF THE RULE AGAINST FILING 
SUR-REPLIES ON DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS
Often courts have (through a local rule of practice, standing
order, and/or case-management plan) a proscription against
the filing of sur-replies on dispositive motions without prior
leave of the court.27 A litigant’s misunderstanding of what a
cross-motion is can lead the litigant to violate a court’s pro-
scription against filing sur-replies on dispositive motions.
Example: Plaintiff files a motion to set aside an
administrative decision. Defendant files a response to
the motion and a “cross-motion” for summary judg-
ment. However, Defendant’s “cross-motion” does not
address any issues related to a motion for summary
judgment but merely responds to the issues raised by
Plaintiff in its original motion. Plaintiff files a reply
on its original motion and an opposition to the
“cross-motion.” Defendant then files a reply on its
“cross-motion.” Plaintiff moves to strike the reply
because the “cross-motion” is improper. Plaintiff’s
motion to strike is granted because Defendant’s
motion practice is an attempt to evade the proscrip-
tion against filing sur-replies on dispositive
motions.28
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29. See, e.g., S.D. Ala. L.R. 7.1(b), (c); D. Ark. L.R. 10.1(m)(2); D.C.
L.Cv.R. 7(e); M.D. Ga. Civ. Rule 7.4; D. Maine Rule 7(e); D. Md.
L.R. 105(2)(c), (3); D. Nev. L.R. 7-4; D.N.J. Civ. R. 7.2(b);
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(1), (b)(1), (c); D.N.D. Civ. L.R. 7.1(A)(1);
E.D. Okla. L.Cv.R. 7.1(k); N.D. Okla. L.Cv.R. 7(h); W.D.N.Y. Civ.
Rule 7(a)(2)(C); E.D. Tex. L.R. CV. 7(1); W.D. Tex. L.R. CV. 7(f);
D. Utah Civ. R. 7-1(b)(3); D. Vt. L.R. 7(a)(5).
30. See Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 4499281, at *6 (“Such a
bifurcated motion practice is prohibited by [the court’s local rule
on page limitations]. . . . The effect of this motion practice was
three-fold: (1) it enlarged the number of pages of memoranda of
law that Defendant Elexco could submit regarding Plaintiffs’ two
trespass claims . . . ; (2) it gave Defendant Elexco the last word
regarding Plaintiffs’ two trespass claims (by permitting Defendant
Elexco to file a reply with regard to those claims, . . . ) . . . ; and (3)
it confused the Court (and no doubt Plaintiffs) by simultaneously
(a) commingling Defendant Elexco’s arguments regarding Plain-
tiffs’ conversion claim with Defendant Elexco’s arguments regard-
ing Plaintiffs’ two trespass claims, and (b) multiplying Defendant
Elexco’s arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ two trespass claims.”).
31. See IP Innovation LLC v. Vizio, Inc., 08-CV-0393, 2010 WL
2696110, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2010) (“Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 56 does not provide a party with the opportunity to file a
separate motion for summary judgment for each argument a party
desires to present.”); DeSena v. Beekley Corp., 09-CV-0352, 2010
WL 1049873, at *1 (D. Me. Mar. 17, 2010) (“Although, as the
plaintiffs maintain, they may well have intended in filing six sepa-
rate summary judgment motions to present segregable issues in an
efficient manner rather than to skirt the page limitation of Local
Rule 7(e), their approach violates the spirit, if not the substance, of
that rule.”); BPI Energy, Inc. v. IEC (Montgomery), LLC, 07-CV-
0186, 2009 WL 3518154, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2009) (“Local
Rule 7.1(d) allows a twenty double-spaced typewritten page limit
for all briefs. Although a literal reading of the local rule does not
specifically prohibit a party from filing more than one summary
judgment motion, the rule also does not lend itself to the interpre-
tation that a party may file one supporting brief per issue raised at
the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.”); Baker v.
AirServ Corp., 08-CV-0913, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33443, at *1-3
(D. Col. Apr. 20, 2009) (striking plaintiff’s cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment, noting that the motion was untimely and
exceeded the imposed page limitations when added to the pages in
plaintiff’s separately filed response to defendants’ motion); Wal-
burn v. City of Naples, Fla., 04-CV-0194, 2005 WL 2322002, at *1,
n.3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2005) (“This Court agrees with Plaintiff’s
statement in his response to Defendant’s dual motions for sum-
mary judgment that the unusual bifurcated approach to summary
judgment is confusing, and it manages to sidestep Rule 3.01(c) of
the Local Rules of this District, which would limit a single memo-
randum to a length of twenty pages.”) [internal quotation marks
omitted]; Paper, Allied Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers, 03-CV-
0225, 2004 WL 1484995, at *5, n.9 (D. Me. June 4, 2004) (“I also
observe that by filing two motions instead of one, the Union has
also violated, in spirit if not in substance, the 20-page limitation
imposed by Local Rule 7.”), recommendation rejected in part on
other grounds, 2004 WL 2536811 (D. Me. Nov. 10, 2004).
D. VIOLATION OF PAGE LIMITATIONS ON 
MEMORANDA OF LAW
Often courts have (through a local rule of practice, standing
order, and/or case-management plan) rules setting forth differ-
ing page limitations for motions, responses, and replies, if not
specifically for cross-motions and responses to cross-
motions.29 A litigant’s misunderstanding of what a cross-
motion is can lead the litigant to violate a court’s page limita-
tion on memoranda of law.
Example 1: The court has a local rule setting a limi-
tation of 25 pages on memoranda of law and 10 pages
on reply memoranda of law. The dispositive-motion
filing deadline is February 1. On January 15, Defen-
dant files a motion for summary judgment on all of
Plaintiff’s claims. On January 20, with due notice of
Defendant’s motion, and without filing a response to
Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff files a separate “motion”
for summary judgment on all of its claims. As a
result, not only does Plaintiff have an improper
opportunity to file a reply on its separate “motion,”
its motion practice has caused the memoranda of law
on the parties’ competing requests for relief to num-
ber 120 pages (25 + 25 + 10 + 25 + 25 + 10), rather
than 60 pages (25 + 25 + 10).30
Example 2: The court has a local rule setting a limi-
tation of 25 pages on memoranda of law. Plaintiff files
a motion for summary judgment on Claim 1 under
Theory X. Defendant files a 25-page response to
Plaintiff’s motion on Claim 1 under Theory X. Sepa-
rately, Defendant files a 25-page “motion” for sum-
mary judgment on Claim 1 under Theory Y. Both
requests for relief were similar (i.e., summary judg-
ment on Claim 1). As a result, Defendant’s “motion”
was really a “cross-motion,” and he was entitled to
only 25 pages in total.31
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THOSE PROBLEMS
Several possible solutions exist to the procedural problems
caused by misunderstandings of the definition of a cross-
motion. Of course, from a court’s perspective, these solutions
include adopting and publishing rules regarding the definition,
timing, and briefing of a “cross-motion.”
In addition, it is useful for a court to know of several things
practitioners can do to solve procedural problems. These solu-
tions include the following: (1) filing a motion before the
opposing party files its motion; (2) requesting leave to depart
from the operative scheduling order or the court’s local rules;
(3) filing a motion to strike the improper cross-motion; and
(4) filing a timely amended complaint (rather than a motion
to amend) in response to a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.
A. FILING A MOTION BEFORE THE OPPOSING
PARTY FILES ITS MOTION
Of course, one solution to the problems often caused by a
party’s violation of the rules regarding cross-motions is for the
party to file its motion (which would otherwise be a “cross-
motion”) before the opposing party files its motion.
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32. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. C & R, 05-CV-1593, 2007 WL
2815038, at *28 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2007) (“At the May 21, 2007
hearing, Defendants’ request to file a supplemental brief on the sole
issue of whether Rule 2010 applied to them was granted. Defen-
dants were notified by minute order on May 21, 2007 that upon fil-
ing the supplemental briefs the matter would be deemed submit-
ted. Defendants were not given leave to file [their untimely] cross
motion for summary judgment at the hearing on May 21, 2007.”);
United States ex rel. IBM v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 2d
1023, 1028-29 (D. Haw. 2000) (declining to consider “cross-
motion” for summary judgment filed “well after the court imposed
deadline[,]” noting that, before the dispositive motion deadline
expired, Defendant could have “request[ed] that the court modify
its Scheduling Order, []or . . . [sought] relief from the Scheduling
Order”).
33. See Spooner v. Jackson, 251 F. App’x 919, 924 (5th Cir. Oct. 24,
2007) (finding that defendant “had demonstrated good cause for
filing his motion for summary judgment after the deadline for fil-
ing dispositive motions based on evidence that [defendant]’s coun-
sel did not receive electronic notice of the scheduling order
because of a computer virus”); Wynn v. Cate, 10-CV-0546, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012) (“Th[e]
[scheduling order] deadline may only be modified upon a showing
of good cause, which exists when the moving party demonstrates
he cannot meet the deadline. . . . Plaintiff’s comparison of his
resources with those of defense counsel does not speak to plaintiff’s
diligence in preparing his own dispositive motion prior to the
court-imposed deadline. Because plaintiff fails to demonstrate
good cause for further extending the deadline for filing dispositive
motions in this case, his request to modify the scheduling order is
denied, and his cross-motion for summary judgment must there-
fore be denied as untimely.”).
34. See Fisherman’s Harvest, Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 681, 690
(Fed. Cl. 2006) (“Plaintiffs’ motion to strike does not comport
with RCFC 12(f) [which is identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)]
because Weeks Marine’s Motion for Leave to Join as Parties and to
Join Claims Against Bertucci and Luhr does not constitute a ‘plead-
ing’ under the rule.”); Sharpe v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 19 F. Supp.
2d 483, 487 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (finding motion to strike cross-
motion for summary judgment as improper and therefore constru-
ing the motion to strike as a response to the motion); but see Ass’n
of Irritated Residents v. C & R, 05-CV-1593, 2007 WL 2815038, at
*27 (E.D. Cal Sept. 25, 2007) (recognizing that plaintiff’s motion
to strike defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment was not
technically proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[f] but liberally constru-
ing that motion to strike “as an invitation by the movant to con-
sider whether [material proffered in support of the cross-motion]
may properly be relied upon.”) [internal quotation marks omit-
ted].
35. See Spooner, 251 F. App’x at 924 (“Spooner asserts that the district
court erred by striking his cross-motion for summary judgment.
He contends that it was unfair for the court to strike his cross-
motion on the ground that it was untimely after the court allowed
Jackson to file his motion for summary judgment after the deadline
for filing dispositive motions established in the scheduling order.
Spooner’s contentions are without merit. The court found that
Jackson had demonstrated good cause for filing his motion for
summary judgment after the deadline for filing dispositive motions
based on evidence that Jackson’s counsel did not receive electronic
notice of the scheduling order because of a computer virus.
Spooner did not offer any excuse for the untimely filing his cross-
motion for summary judgment.”); Wells Fargo Bank, 09-CV-0678,
2011 WL 3702666, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2011) (“Wells Fargo
moves to strike Falk’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment. The deadline for filing dispositive motions was December
10, 2010. . . . On January 10, 2011, Falk submitted his Cross-
Motion as part of his Response to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment. Falk’s only explanation for failing to file his motion by,
or request an extension of, the dispositive motions deadline is that
it was the result of ‘inadvertence or because he had not previously
thought of filing a Cross-Motion.’ . . . Finding no good cause to
extend the dispositive motions deadline, the Court STRIKES Falk’s
untimely pleading pursuant to Federal Rule 16(f)(1)(c).”);
Wuliger v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 03-CV-7699, 2011 WL
767872, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2011) (explaining, in ruling on
motion to strike untimely cross-motion, that “[t]he Court has
broad discretion in imposing sanctions for violations of its sched-
uling orders”); Lo v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 03-CV-5055,
2005 WL 1388680, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (“The
United States moves the court to strike plaintiff’s cross-motion or
requests that plaintiff’s cross-motion otherwise be dismissed. Rule
16(f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the court to impose
such sanctions . . . .”); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 96-CV-
0824, 1998 WL 35235446, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 23, 1998) (grant-
ing motion “to strike plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judg-
ment as untimely . . . under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f).”). 
36. Cf. Paliotta v. Nev., 11-CV-0121, 2012 WL 553131, at *2-3 (D. Nev.
Jan. 5, 2012) (granting in part and denying in part defendants’
motion to strike plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment,
striking his sur-reply, filed as part of his reply on his cross-motion
B. REQUESTING LEAVE TO DEPART FROM A
SCHEDULING ORDER OR LOCAL RULES
A second solution is for a party to request leave to depart
from any (1) scheduling order establishing a motion-filing
deadline or (2) local rules of practice proscribing the filing of
(a) replies on non-dispositive motions and cross-motions, (b)
sur-replies on any motions, and (c) memoranda of law exceed-
ing the applicable page limitation.32
In support of such a request, it is helpful for the party to
advise the court of the following, if applicable: (i) the good-
faith need for such a departure; (ii) the lack of undue delay in
making the request; (iii) the lack of prejudice to (and prefer-
ably the lack of opposition by) the opposing party; and (iv) the
fact that it is the first such request.33
C. FILING A MOTION TO STRIKE AN IMPROPER
CROSS-MOTION
A third solution is for a party to move to strike the improper
cross-motion or deny the cross-motion on procedural grounds.  
It is important to note that, in federal court, a motion to
strike a cross-motion is not properly made pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(f) because that rule regards the striking of “plead-
ings,” and a cross-motion is not a “pleading” under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 7(a).34 Rather, a motion to strike a cross-motion may be
properly made pursuant to the Court’s authority to impose
sanctions against a party for failing to obey a scheduling or
other pretrial order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(C).35 In addi-
tion, a motion to strike a cross-motion may be properly made
pursuant to the court’s inherent authority to enforce its local
rules of practice.36
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for summary judgment, because it was in violation of the court’s
local rules of practice, and warning him that his “failure to abide
by the Local Rules, including page limitations, in the future, will
result in an order striking noncompliant documents”); World Pub-
l’g Co. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 09-CV-0574, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32594, at *25 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2011) (considering
defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s opposition based on the
argument that, “to the extent it purports to be a cross-motion for
summary judgment[,] it violates Northern District of Oklahoma
Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)[,]” which prohibits a response to a motion
to include a cross-motion, and ultimately converting the response
into a cross-motion).     
37. See Bell v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., 370 F. Supp. 2d
805, 806, n.1 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (denying motion to strike cross-
motion because no prejudice was shown); cf. Carlwood Dev. Inc. v.
United States, 10-CV-1773, 2011 WL 69374, at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 10,
2011) (striking the government’s unauthorized reply on its
improper cross-motion as “nothing more than a disingenuous
attempt to get the last word”); Byce v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 09-CV-
1912, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6816, at *3-6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2011)
(considering plaintiff’s “excusable neglect” and prejudice to defen-
dant in deciding whether to grant defendant’s motion to strike
plaintiff’s untimely filed cross-motion for summary judgment);
Daly v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 00-CV-0040, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16183, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2002) (considering prejudice to
defendant, finding none, and accordingly denying defendant’s
motion to strike plaintiff’s untimely filed cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment).
38. See Fisherman’s Harvest, Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 681, 690
(Fed. Cl. 2006) (“Instead, courts may regard a motion to strike a
motion simply as a response to that motion.”); Falk v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 09-CV-0678, 2011 WL 3702666, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19,
2011) (“[T]he Court finds that despite being styled as a cross-
motion, Falk’s arguments are more appropriately addressed as a
response to Wells Fargo’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Accord-
ingly, the Court will address the arguments made in Falk’s Cross-
Motion along with the arguments made in Falk’s Response.”);
Sharpe v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 483, 487 (E.D.N.C.
1998) (“Because MCI has not filed a proper motion to strike under
Rule 12(f), the Court must interpret MCI’s motion as a response to
Sharpe’s motion which challenges the motion on procedural
grounds.”).
39. See, e.g., Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 11-CV-1754, 2012 WL
6204182, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012); Patrick v. Teays Valley Tr.,
LLC, 12-CV-0039, 2012 WL 5993163, at *1 (N.D. W.Va. Nov. 30,
2012); Leal v. McHugh, 11-CV-0249, 2011 WL 6372820, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2011); J.S. ex rel. Simpson v. Thorsen, 766 F.
Supp. 2d 695, 700 (E.D. Va. 2011).
40. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in perti-
nent part, that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter
of course within . . . 21 days after service of a responsive pleading
or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f),
whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
41. See infra note 40.
The legal standard governing a motion to strike a cross-
motion varies somewhat by jurisdiction; however, generally,
that standard involves a determination of such issues as (1)
prejudice to the party opposing the cross-motion, (2) bad faith
by the cross-movant through merely attempting to get in the
last word through a reply, and/or (3) undue delay by the cross-
movant through waiting until the expiration of the motion-fil-
ing deadline to file its cross-motion.37 If the court denies the
motion to strike a cross-motion, the court generally possesses
the discretion to construe the motion to strike the cross-
motion as an opposition to the cross-motion based on proce-
dural grounds.38
D. FILING A TIMELY AMENDED COMPLAINT
(RATHER THAN A CROSS-MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO AMEND) IN RESPONSE TO A MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
A fourth solution, in federal court, is to avoid the need for
a cross-motion altogether in cases in which a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim has been filed pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This can be done by filing a timely amended
complaint as a matter of right, rather than filing a cross-motion
for leave to file an amended complaint.39 Such an amended
complaint is “timely” if it is filed within 21 days of service of
such a motion.40 Note, however, that if the motion challenging
the pleading sufficiency of the complaint is one for “judgment
on the pleadings” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), filed after
the filing of an answer, then the amended complaint may be
filed as a matter of right only within 21 days of the service of
the answer.41
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